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In  the  context  of  the  growing  coordination  of  labour  market  policies  (LMP) 
implementation within the European Employment Strategy (EES), the Eurostat offers a 
harmonised  database  that  intends  to  be  a  valuable  instrument  for  international 
comparisons  in  the  field.  However,  because  its  tight  scope  fails  to  include  some 
important LMP measures, this database has been playing a small role on studies related 
with the EES as well on those broadly focusing on labour market and employment 
policies. 
This paper intends to address, by using meaningful LMP measures - tax credits in the 
UK, the prime pour l'emploi and general reductions of employers’ social contributions 
in  France  -,  the  importance  of  having  a  more  comprehensive  database,  while 
maintaining its current structure. For that we discuss the aims and the level of targeting 
defined by the Eurostat and we include, under this framework, an assessment of these 
measures to illustrate the limits of the database. 
We conclude that these policies - apparently fitting the broad objectives of the EES - are 
explicitly targeted to the labour market, aim at improving its efficiency and undoubtedly 
benefit  particular  groups.  Moreover,  they  have  an  important  impact  in  terms  of 
participants and expenditure involved. 
 
JEL classification: J00; J08. 
Keywords: European Employment Strategy; Eurostat Database; Active Labour Market Policies; 
Tax Credits; Reductions of Social Security Contributions.   2 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION
1 
The construction of a Labour Market Policy (LMP) database raises many questions. The 
most important is certainly its scope, due to diversity of the goals and instruments that 
are  generally  included  in  the  LMP  and  to  the  lack  of  clear  frontiers  distinguishing 
between employment, welfare, social or fiscal policies. Each country builds its own 
system of administrative and policy categories and the comparisons between countries 
have to take into account that similar designations can hide different effective policies. 
The recent movement of coordination of LMP within the framework of the European 
Employment Strategy tends to favour the adoption of a common language among the 
participant countries that introduces an apparent convergence of policies, however not 
always  corresponding  to  a  real  convergence  (Barbier,  2006).  The  Eurostat  offers  a 
harmonised LMP database that intends to be a valuable instrument for international 
comparisons in the field. 
 
However,  the  database  has  been  playing  a  small  role  on  studies  dealing  with  the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) and its correlated topics, as well as on those 
focusing on labour market and employment policies in general. Its role is often limited 
to the computation of the share of active and passive measures. Additionally, some 
measures to which the state devotes greater importance, covering large portions of the 
population, involving a significant amount of the state budgets and playing a crucial 
role in the implementation of the EES, as highlighted by the National Action Plans for 
Employment (NAPE), are not monitored by the Eurostat LMP database. 
 
This paper intends to discuss, by using three meaningful labour market policy measures 
- tax credits in the UK, the prime pour l'emploi and general reductions of employers’ 
social  contributions  in  France  -  the  importance  of  having  a  more  comprehensive 
database, covering additional important policy measures and maintaining the current 
structure: stocks and flows of participants and public expenditure involved. This would 
carry valuable contribution to comparative studies, as long as the usual requirements 
concerning the policy context are met. 
 
We proceed by questioning the scope of the current database, taking into account its 
specific aims. For that we discuss both the aim and the level of targeting that has been 
selected by the Eurostat and introduce in the discussion an assessment of the measures 
to illustrate the limits and fragilities of the database. 
 
The Eurostat has started the construction and the publication of the LMP database in 
2000.
2  According  to  the  European  Commission  (2000:  3),  this  database  intends  to 
record labour market expenditure and participants and “aims to provide comparable 
data for the follow-up of some aspects of the Employment Guidelines whilst taking into 
account national specificities (…)”. Moreover, the scope of LMP database is defined as 
to include policy measures identified with “Public interventions
3 in the labour market 
aimed at reaching its efficient functioning and to correct disequilibria and which can be 
distinguished  from  other  general  employment  policy  measures  in  that  they  act 
                                                
1   This  paper  was  written  drawing  on  helpful  contributions  from  the  researchers  in  the  RESORE 
network, in particular those from Peter Urwin, Adréana Khristova and Jean-Pascal Higelé. 
2   This database maintains clear links with the OECD Labour Market Programmes database. 
3   Central, state/regional or local government and the social security funds.   3 
selectively to favour particular groups in the labour market.” (European Commission, 
2000: 4). Broadly, the European Commission (2000) refers target groups as including 
the unemployed, people in employment but in risk of involuntary job-loss, and inactive 
persons who are currently not part of the labour force but who would like to enter the 
labour market and are disadvantaged in some way. 
 
Tax credits in the UK, the prime pour l'emploi and general reductions of employers’ 
social  contributions  in  France  are  explicitly  targeted  to  the  labour  market,  aim  at 
improving its efficiency and undoubtedly benefit particular groups (unemployed and 
inactive, low-wage and low-income workers and disadvantaged people). Because of the 
too narrow scope of its LMP selection, LMP database fails to include such measures - 
with  important  impact  in  terms  of  participants  and  expenditure  involved  -  that 
apparently fit the broad objectives of the European Employment Strategy. 
 
In what follows, we propose to detail the tax-benefit measures put in place by the UK – 
the tax credits (section 2) – and by France – prime pour l’emploi (section 3) – and also 
the general reduction of employers’ social security contributions in France (section 4), 
suggesting  that  the  general  government  resources  allocated  to  them  could  also  be 
accounted for in the LMP database. These measures are first briefly detailed in their 
formal design alongside with the characterization of the target population involved. 
 
The arguing proceeds on the grounds that these are policies designed to improve labour 
market  efficiency,  they  meet  several  of  the  general  objectives  of  the  European 
Employment Strategy, as well as those of the specific adopted Employment Guidelines. 
Furthermore, these policies broadly fit the requirements to be included as Employment 
Incentives (category 4) which, together with Direct Job Creation (category 6) are, on 
average, the most representative categories of active measures in the European Union in 
terms of expenditure and of participants involved (European Commission, 2000). 
 
The line of argument is reinforced by the relevance of these policies in terms of the 
expenditure involved and number of participants (see Table 1, below). 
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TABLE 1: Brief outlook of the relative importance of tax credits and general reductions 
















in % of  Eurostat’s 
ALMP expenditure 
(2) 
UK         
WTC “Working Tax 
Credit” (April 2003) 
2.3 
(A)  7.9 % 
(A) 
CTC “Child Tax 
Credit” (April 2003)  
7.4 






FRANCE         
“Prime pour l’Emploi” 
(2003) 
8.3  
(B)  25% 
(C)  2221  17% 




(D)  36.7%  15039 
(3)  115% 
Notes:  
(A) Own estimations based on the number of persons covered: couples (2 persons) plus single-person 
households (Source: HM Revenue and Customs, 2005). 
(B) Number of tax households beneficiaries (Source: Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry; 
General Tax Directorate, Forecasting Directorate Analysis, in French NAPE, 2004: 154. 
(C) Tax households’ beneficiaries in % of total tax households. 
(D) Data refers to April 2004 according to French NAPE 2004. 
(1) Source: European Commission (2005a). Labour force = employment + unemployment. 
(2) Source: European Commission (2005b). ALMP is the total of categories 2-7. 
(3)  Source:  Acoss-Urssaf,  in  Rouxelin  (2005:  2),  table  2,  corresponding  to  “Mesures  générales 
d’encourragement à la création d’emplois et à la RTT dont Forec  (champ 2003).” 
 
Since the aim of LMP database is to provide comparative data to assess follow-through 
rates  of  the  employment  strategy,  missing  this  information  leads  towards  biased 
monitoring analysis, in particular, in regard to relative weight of active versus passive 
measures. For instance, among the adopted list of indicators to monitor the Employment 
Guidelines, only the ratio "LMP expenditure/GDP" is collected from the LMP database; 
even the follow-up of participants in active measures relies in national data sources (The 
Employment Committee, 2004 and European Commission, 2004b). Moreover, the LMP 
database  publications  are  of  widespread  use  in  both  official  and  academic  studies, 
possibly leading to inaccurate results in assessing the functioning of the labour market 
(e.g., European Commission, 2004c). 
 
In section 5 we provide final remarks. 
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2.  A  CASE  FOR  THE  INCLUSION  OF  UK  TAX  CREDITS  IN  THE  EUROSTAT  LMP 
DATABASE 
 
This section aims at discussing the inclusion of the UK tax credits in the LMP database. 
We focus on Working Tax Credit (WTC), introduced in 2003, and the Child Tax Credit 
(CTC),  two  recent  in-work  measures  upgrading  on  their  predecessors:  the  Family 
Income Support (1971), the Family Credit (1988) and the Working Families’ Tax Credit 
(1999). 
 
To start with, we briefly describe the UK system of tax credits in order to argue how 
their formal design fit into the European Employment Strategy. We then proceed with 
the analysis of their major effects on the labour market, as well as with a tentative 
exercise on how tax credits would improve on the ALMP figures effectively recorded in 
the LMP database for the UK. 
 
 
2.1.  TAX  CREDITS  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  EMPLOYMENT  STRATEGY  INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
Since one of the main aims of the LMP database is to provide comparative data to 
assess the follow-through rates of the employment strategy, we propose to argue that, in 
regards  to  the  formal  policy  design,  the  UK  tax  credits  fit  the  EES  institutional 
framework. 
 
Official  European  Council  documents  relative  to  either  the  Guidelines  for  the 
employment policies or to the specific recommendations for each Member State deliver 
motivation for including tax credits in the Eurostat LMP database. 
 
We  argue  that  tax  credits  fully  fulfil  the  general  horizontal  objectives,  roughly 
maintained for 2005-2008 (OJEC, 2005, L 205/23), regarding Full Employment and the 
Strengthening  Social  Cohesion.  Regarding  full  employment,  and  according  to  the 
European  Council  2005,  policies  should  be  pursued  to  improve,  for  the  European 
Union,  the  overall  employment  rate.  As  for  Strengthening  Social  Cohesion, 
“Determined action is needed to strengthen social inclusion, prevent exclusion from the 
labour market and support integration in employment of people at a disadvantage (…)” 
(OJEC, 2005: L 205/23). 
 
Both these objectives are present ever since 1997, but the specific adopted Guidelines 
where  tax  credits  could  help  their  accomplishment  have  changed  slightly.  Up  until 
2003, tax credits could well fit “Improving Employability” – through transitions from 
passive to active measures – and “Strengthening the Policies for Equal Opportunities” – 
policies aimed at tackling gender gaps and reconciling work and family life –, as the 
several UK NAPEs reported.  
 
Recently,  tax  credits  can  easily  fit  Employment  Guideline  nº  19  that  relays  upon 
financial  incentives  to  encourage  taking-up  and  remaining  in  work.  Accordingly, 
Member States should “Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness, 
and make work pay for job-seekers, including disadvantaged people, and the inactive 
through: (…) continual review of the incentives and of the disincentives resulting from   6 
the tax and the benefit systems, including the management and conditionality of benefits 
and a significant reduction of high marginal effective tax rates, notably for those with 
low incomes, whilst ensuring adequate levels of social protection  (…)” (OJEC, 2005: 
L205/25). 
 
In  fact,  the  Working  Families’  Tax  Credits  (WFTC)  were  included  in the “Making 
Work Pay” reform package of the Government Budget in 1998 (ECOTEC, 2002: 23), 
aiming at providing a comprehensive strategy to move people from welfare into work 
by making work financially more attractive (Peer Review, 2000: 1, Brewer, 2003: 1). 
The recently introduced (2003) Working Tax Credit (WTC) aims to “relieve in-work 
poverty  and  enhance  work  incentives  for  workers  facing  disadvantage  with  more 
financial  help  to  those  in  low-paid  work,  whether  or  not  with  children.”  (Inland 
Revenue, 2002a: 1). Currently (HMRC, 2007), families must have at least one member 
in-work  (at  least  16  hours  a  week)  to  qualify  for  the  WTC.  Single  people  without 
children are entitled to a credit of £1730 per annum (~ £33.27 per week) while couples 
with or without children and lone parents are entitled to a credit of £3430per annum (~ 
£65.96 per week). Moreover, there are extra amounts for some adults with disabilities 
and for people over 50 returning to work. Clearly the WTC is an active LMP measure as 
it provides financial support to in-work situations, proportionally higher for particular 
groups  experiencing  disadvantages  in  entering  or  re-entering  the  labour  market,  in 
contrast, for instance, with the passive nature of the unemployment benefit. 
 
Tax  credits  also  help  to  accomplish  Employment  Guideline  nº  18  (2005-2008): 
“Promote a lifecycle approach to work through (…) resolute action to increase female 
participation and reduce gender gaps in employment, unemployment and pay, better 
reconciliation  of  work  and  private  life  and  the  provision  of  the  accessible  and 
affordable  childcare  facilities  and  care  for  other  dependants  (…)”  (OJEC,  2005: 
L205/24). In fact, additionally to the lone parents more generous support, the WTC 
includes a childcare element (HMRC, 2007), according to which families with children 
where all adults are working, caring or disabled can receive help with 80% of approved 
childcare costs below a generous maximum (£175 per week for those with one child 
under 16, £300 for the others). The other successor measure of the WFTC is the Child 
Tax Credit, also introduced in 2003, with the aim to “tackle child poverty and provide 
financial support for households with children, by providing a seamless, portable and 
secure system of support for households with children” (Inland Revenue, 2002a: 1). 
Currently  (HMRC,  2007),  the  CTC  is  paid  to  the  main  carer,  irrespective  of 
employment  status, and  consists  of  two  components:  a  family  element  of  £545  per 
annum (~ £10.45 per week), doubled in the financial year of a child’s birth and an 
amount per dependent child of £1845 per annum (~ £35.48 per week, and higher for 
disabled children). 
 
By providing additional financial support to households with children, both the WTC 
and the CTC enhance the reconciliation of work and family life. Moreover, and in this 
regard,  tax  credits  are  also  in  line  with  the  aims  underlying  the  Council  specific 
recommendations  to  the  UK.  The  crucial  UK  labour  market  bottleneck  is  the 
concentration  of  inactivity  and  long-term  unemployment  amongst  particularly 
disadvantaged  persons,  namely  lone  parents  and  households  with  no  one  in  work 
(OJEC, 2003: L 197/30, among others) - lone mothers had the lowest employment rates, 
substantially below the EU average; this requires  that active labour market policies 
should be reinforced. Policies are recommended to further improve the access and the   7 
affordability  of  childcare  with  a  view  to  make  it  easier  for  parents  to  take-up 
employment (OJEC, 2001: L 22/37, among others) and to reduce the gender gap in 
terms of full-time equivalents once part-time work is particularly concentrated among 
women in the UK (OJEC, 2000: 40). In order to promote quality employment, namely 
full-time employment, the WTC also includes a bonus for those working 30 or more 
hours per week (HMRC, 2007). 
 
Families with annual gross incomes below £14 495 (CTC) or below £5220 (WTC) are 
entitled  to  the  full  amounts.  Above  theses  thresholds,  the  tax  credit  received  is 
progressively  reduced.  Thus,  these  measures  are  broadly  targeted  at  low-income 
households,  either  with  or  without  children,  increasing  their  financial  support  to 
enhance  employability.
4  They  respect  to  a  mechanism  of  negative  tax,  applying 
according to the level of wage income, hours of work and the composition of the family, 




In spite of the adequacy of tax credits in fulfilling the aims compatible with those of the 
European Employment Strategy, tax credits have always been absent from the Eurostat 
LMP database. Moreover, tax credits are non-negligible policy measures in terms of the 
expenditure and the number of participants involved. Together, in-work CTC and WTC 
were disseminated over roughly 20% of the labour force in the fiscal years of 2003-04 
to  2005-06.  From  0.14%  of  the  UK  GDP  in  1999-00  (total  tax  credit  expenditure 
according to HM Treasury, 2004), expenditure related only to the in-work tax credits 
steadily increased to 1.2% of the UK GDP in 2005-06 (HM Revenue and Customs, 
2007). This financial effort is substantially larger when compared to that involved in the 
active labour market policy measures effectively recorded in the Eurostat database and 
which represented, for the EU15, only 0.55% of the GDP in 2005 (see Table 4, below). 
 
 
2.2.  THE EFFECTIVE IMPACTS OF TAX CREDITS ON THE LABOUR MARKET – A TENTATIVE 
ASSESSMENT 
 
In order to assess how relevant these measures are to fulfil the aims of the EES, we now 
try to account for the effective impacts of tax credits. Instead of an exhaustive analysis, 
we rely in several studies (mostly on the WFTC
6), either from official or independent 
offices, to exemplify the impacts of tax credits in three target variables: employment, 




According to Peters et al (2004: 344), “the literature has shown that family tax credits 
can  be  effective  at  combating  unemployment  and  also  long-term  unemployment”. 
According to ECOTEC (2002), since the introduction of the WFTC, the take-up rates 
have  steadily  increased  and  were  higher  among  those  in  most  need  (HM  Treasury, 
                                                
4   Eligibility: those with childcare responsibilities (CTC) and individual workers working at least 30 
hours a week and families with children or with a disabled element, provided that one of the persons 
works at least 16 hours a week, for the WTC (Brewer, 2003: 5). 
5   Peer Review (2000: 2). 
6   Because the CTC and the WTC have only been introduced in 2003, there are few data and studies 
available.   8 
2005). The recent introduction of CTC and WTC also improved on the simplification of 
the claims processes, making it easier for families to apply (Inland Revenue, 2002a: 4) 
and,  thus,  improving  the  take-up  rates.  Table  2  shows  the  evolution  of  recipient 
households entitled with WFTC/WTC in recent years. 
 

















790  965  1294  1376  1586  1824  1813  1884 
Sources: ECOTEC (2002), Inland Revenue (2002b, 2004), HMRC (2006). 
 
Moreover,  and in regard to the employment  status, data in November 2002 (Inland 
Revenue, 2002b: 2) shows that most of the families were, in fact, benefiting from this 
additional element. Most of the beneficiary families were also, structurally, employees 
(in 2002, self employed receiving the WFTC represented 9.5% of total recipients). Form 
2003-04 to 2005-06, 38% to 0 39% of the in-work tax credits (in-work CTC and WTC) 
benefiting families received the 30 hour element (HM Revenue and Customs, 2007). 
 
Roughly stable relative to the 2003-04 fiscal year, the disabled (and severely disabled) 
element was entitled to 2.6% of the in-work tax credits benefiting families, while the 
50+ return to work element covered 0.3% of the recipient families in 2005-06. The main 
important additional element is the childcare element, covering 7.5% of the tax credit 
benefiting families in 2005-06 (HM Revenue and Customs, 2007). 
 
There are few available studies on the impact of tax credits on employment. Blundell 
and Reed (2000), summarise three available studies from the IFS
7 predicting the impact 
of the WFTC on employment by following distinct methodologies (Gregg et al, 1999, 
Blundell et al, 1998 and Paull et al, 1999)
8.  The  overall impact on  employment is 
estimated  in  roughly  3%  with  the  highest  employability  gains  accruing  to  single 
mothers (1.6% to 2.20%) and to married women whose partner is not working (1.32% 
to  1.75%).  According  to  Gregg  et  al  (1999)
9,  estimates  of  the  gross  increase  in 
participation  were  of  92  thousand  additional  workers,  60  thousand  women  and  32 
thousand  men.  The  aggregate  employment  effect  was  not  as  strong  because  of  the 
negative effect the WFTC was expected to have on married women with children and 
employed partners (Peer Review, 2000: 4).  
Nevertheless, and according to the UK NAPE (2004: 30), the employment rate for lone 
parents  increased  from  45.3%  in  1997  to  54.3%  in  2004,  and  the  WTC  has  also 
improved work incentives for workers aged 25 or over, without children. According to 
independent studies reported by the HM Treasury (2005: 28), the childcare element of 
the WFTC has also helped families in getting back into work. 
                                                
7   Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
8   Research by Paul Gregg, Paul Johnson and Howard Reed, funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
(1999); Research by Richard Blundell, Alan Duncan, Julian McCrae and Costas Meghir, funded by 
the Bank of England and the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Policy at IFS 
(1998); Research by Gillian Paull, Ian Walker and Yu Zhu, funded by the Nuffield Foundation (1999). 
9   See previous footnote.   9 
 
FIGURE 1: Employment rate for lone parents and workless households with children 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2005: 30). 
 
Figure 1, above, illustrates how the introduction of tax credits made work financially 
more rewarding, especially for lone parents and workless families. These are, in fact, 
the typical disadvantaged groups with higher than average unemployment and long-
term unemployment rates towards which the European Council severally addressed its 




Targeted at low-wage employed and at low-income families with children, the WTC 
and CTC cover mostly employees in the services and public sectors. According to the 
Inland Revenue (2002b: 1), and in regards to the WFTC recipients, “nearly half of lone 
parent recipients had administrative, secretarial or personal service occupations. For 
couples, over half the main earners had skilled trades, were process, plant or machine 
operatives  or  had  elementary  occupations”;  there  are  also  individuals  in  top-up 
occupations  receiving  the  WFTC,  although  representing  only  nearly  5%  of  the 
employed persons in those groups. Thus, the tax credits were clearly benefiting low to 
mid-skilled (and, thus, low to mid-paid) occupations. 
 
The employment effects arose, essentially, because WFTC and WTC improved the in-
work financial support to low/moderate-income families, thus tackling unemployment, 
poverty and inactivity traps. According to the Peer Review (2000)
10 on the UK tax and 
benefit reform, WFTC have led to a 9-10% increase in the incomes of families with 
children  on  low  income.  Although  work  incentives  were  improved  on  a  household 
basis, second earners in low-income families with children could face lower incentives 
to work. 
 
                                                
10   The Peer Review was organised by the HM Treasury under the mutual learning programme.   10 
Comparatively  to  the  predecessor  Family  Credit  (FC),  the  WFTC  substantially 
increased  income  for  in-work  families  as  it  provided  similar  rents,  relative  to 
unemployment benefits, even for typical entry-wage jobs. According to HM Treasury 
(2005: 28), in 2000, the WFTC improved average income by 14.1%, among the families 
receiving the FC in 1999, improved the income of lone parents that moved in-work by 
44%, among those receiving the Family Income Support in 1999, and reduced sharply 
the risk of severe hardship relative to the Family Credit for both lone parent and couple 
families. 
 
Based on the Inland Revenue (2002b), weekly average awards of the WFTC (including 
childcare  charges)  amounted  weekly  up  to  £83.96  (£158.2)  in  November  2001  and 
£86.78 (£178.3) in November 2002. Under the new WTC and the CTC together, awards 
range from £29.2 to £169.2 per week for the WTC and from £10.45 to £51.75 per week 
for the CTC (by simply adding the highest tax credit additional element), according to 
HM Treasury (2002: 32). Within these bands, and relying on the average award, we can 
easily conclude that most of the recipient families are concentrated in the highest values 
for the awards, as Inland Revenue (2002b) illustrates. Average awards clearly followed 
an important growth path since the introduction of the WFTC in 1999: in 1989, average 
FC awards were slightly above £25 per week and, by the end of 2002, the average 
WFTC was close to £90 per week, an increase positively biased towards lone parents 
(Inland Revenue, 2002b: 8). 
 
 “The Working Tax Credit (WTC) has improved work incentives for workers aged 25 
and over without children. From October 2003, a childless or disabled couple aged 25 
and over in full-time work will be guaranteed at least £187 per week. This represents an 
increase in gains to work to £40 per week, compared with £15 per week before the 
introduction of the WTC. The reforms also mean that a single person aged 25 or over 
without children working full-time on the National Minimum Wage will be more than 
£25 a week better off from October 2003 compared with the previous system – an 18% 
increase in income” (UK NAPE, 2003: 36). 
 
Due to progressive reductions, entitlement is exhausted at an income of around £10 857 
per annum for a single person without children, £13 230 for a lone parent or a couple 
with children working part time, and £14 911 for a lone parent or a couple with or 
without  children  working  full-time.  A  family  with  children  spending  the  maximum 
allowed on childcare (£10 430 a year) can still be entitled to the Working Tax Credit at 
highest income stepladder, representing roughly 392% of the National Minimum Wage 
(at the 2005 hourly rate of £4.85, HM Treasury, 2005: 24). This confirms that although 
these “reforms have been targeted largely at low-paid families with children there is 
evidence to show that other couples and individuals are also benefiting” (ECOTEC, 
2002: 31). In addition, recall that individuals in Associate professional and technical 
occupations, Professional occupations and even top-up Managers and senior officials 
were estimated to be receiving the WFTC, representing nearly 13% of the recipients 
households in 2002 (Inland Revenue, 2002b). 
 
Also  in  line  with  the  Employment  Guideline  nº  19,  the  overall  reform  package 
including, besides tax credits, the reforms to National Insurance Contributions (NIC) 
and  income  taxes,  made  the  number  of  families  facing  marginal  deduction  rates  in 
excess of 70% to fall substantially since 1997-8, the same happening with the families   11 
facing the highest – above 90% - marginal deduction rates. Table 3 shows the effects of 
the overall reforms on marginal deduction rates. 
 
 TABLE 3: The effect of the Government’s reforms on high Marginal Deduction Rates 
Marginal Deduction Rate
1  Before Budget  1998  2005-06 system of tax and benefits 
Over 100 per cent  5000  0 
Over 90 per cent  130 000  30 000 
Over 80 per cent  300 000  165 000 
Over 70 per cent  740 000  235 000 
Over 60 per cent  760 000  1730 000 
1Marginal Deduction  Rates  are for  working  households  in  receipt  of  income-related  benefits  or  tax 
credits where at least one person works 16 hours or more a week, and the head of the household is not 
disabled. 
Note: Figures are cumulative. Before Budget 1998 based on 1997-98 estimated caseload and take-up 
rates; the 2005-06 system of tax and benefits is based on 2003-04 caseload and take-up rates. 
Source: HM Treasury (2005: 30). 
 
According to he UK NAPE (2003: 37), the introduction of tax credits was the main 
policy  measure  responsible  for  the  increase  in  the  number  of  households  facing 
marginal deduction rates of between 60 and 70%. 
 
However, a critical assessment on the work incentives attached to the UK tax credits is 
provided in Blundell and Meghir (2001) and Blundell and Hoynes (2001). The first 
argue that tax credits are means tested and have no time-limit, two features Eurostat 
ALMP do not match overall. The most important implications are that these schemes 
“reduce human capital accumulation and may thus create a culture of dependency on 
the programme” (Blundell and Meghir, 2001: 262). They also rely on studies testifying 
that  wage progression  is low and, thus, exiting the low-pay jobs and  the tax credit 
programme is proved to be a difficult task. Additionally, the smaller incentives to work 
when  compared,  for  instance,  with  the  US  Earned  Income  Tax  Credit  may  result 
because they are taken as income for the eligibility condition to apply for other transfer 
programmes,  reducing  net-benefits;  at  the  same  time,  UK’s  in-work  schemes  were 
implemented alongside with a stability or even an improvement in the generosity of out-
of-work  benefits,  inducing  “rather  modest  increases  in  the  incentives  to  work.” 




Looking at Figure 2, lone mothers households represented more than half of the families 
in recipient of the WFTC. 
   12 




Couple male main earner Couple female main earner
Lone parent male Lone parent female
 
Source: Inland Revenue (2002b: 11). 
 
Relying on the Impact Evaluation Report (ECOTEC, 2002), since the introduction of 
WFTC and up to 2001, additional 129 700 lone parents were claiming WFTC, 94% of 
which being women. However, and overall, the proportion of females over those in-
work receiving the WFTC and WTC plus CTC (since 2003) peaked in 2002, 97%, to be 
reduced in 2004, to 89% (Sources: ECOTEC, 2002, Inland Revenue, 2002b, 2003 and 
2004); taking WTC only, the female weight was around 60% (Inland Revenue, 2004). 
 
According to the same report, female unemployment was 78 thousand lower among the 
women of working age in 2000, when compared to 1998, but these are overall effects of 
the reforms introduced in 1999, and of difficult assessment by individualised policies. 
 
The WTC provides help up to 70% of the childcare costs, enabling even parents on the 
lowest incomes to work (HM Treasury, 2005: 29). Such support helps shrinking the 
highest gender gap in employment among the EU countries attributable to the impact of 
parenthood, an explicit recommendation by the European Council in 2001 (OJEC, 2001: 
L 22/37). 
 
Besides tax credits explicitly improve the reconciliation between work and family life, 
in particular for women, the WFTC (and the new WTC as well) included a 30-hour 
credit  to  incentive  full-time  jobs.  This  feature  is  important  as  the  gender  gap  in 
employment is biased towards women in part-time jobs in the UK. Alleviating such 
disparity was a concern of the European Council in the policy recommendations of 
2000. Data for 2002 shows that 58% of the WFTC recipient families were receiving the 
30-hour additional award (Inland Revenue, 2002b: 2). 
 
 
2.3.  INCLUDING TAX CREDITS IN THE EUROSTAT LMP DATABASE: AN EXERCISE 
 
In spite of, apparently, tax credits being targeted to improve work attractiveness and to 
meet the structural imbalances in UK labour market, the Eurostat LMP reports have 
never addressed such polices, underestimating the role of active labour market policies 
(ALMP)  in  the  UK  and  thus  misleading  results  in  studies  with  cross-countries 
comparative purposes. For instance, relying on the Eurostat statistics on LMP in 2003, 
and  excluding  Greece,  the  UK  exhibited  the  lowest  expenditure  effort  on  ALMP   13 
(categories 2-7), 0.16% of the GDP when compared to the EU-15 average of 0.71% of 
the GDP. Active expenditure on Employment Incentives, to support the transition of 
unemployed into regular market jobs, typically through wage subsidies or exemptions to 
employers’  social contributions  (Melis,  2005: 5)  represented, in the UK,  the  lowest 
weight in total ALMP expenditure, 1.6% in 2003, when compared to the EU-15 average 
of close to 20%. Up until 2005, Eurostat records on UK ALMP expenditure have fallen 
to 0.12% of the GDP against 0.55% of the correspondent for the EU15 (Table 4, below). 
 
TABLE 4: Eurostat statistics on LMP expenditures 
LMP database categories 2003 2004 2005
(2-7)/(2-9) UK 40.6% 45.1% 38.2%
(2-7)/(2-9) EU15 33.3% 30.6% 27.8%
(2-7)/GDP UK 0.16% 0.15% 0.12%
(2-7)/GDP EU15 0.71% 0.63% 0.55%
(2-9)/GDP UK 0.39% 0.34% 0.30%
(2-9)/GDP EU15 2.12% 2.05% 1.96%  
 
Even excluding tax credits, the UK spends substantially more on active policies relative 
to the EU15: in 2005, roughly 38% of total (categories 2-9) LMP expenditure was on 
ALMP against the EU average of nearly 28%. Melis (2005: 4, 7) shows that between 
1998 and 2003, total expenditure on both active and passive LMP has, on an annual 
average,  fallen  around  7%  in  per  capita
11  real  terms  in  the  UK,  with  expenditure 
attached to Employment Incentives exhibiting an estimated annual decrease of 33% in 
per capita real terms. Strikingly, however, the overall unemployment rate in the UK has 
fallen, between 1998 and 2003, from 6.2% to 4.9%. 
 
Taking now the information on total in-work tax credits expenditure and participants 
released by the HM Revenue and Customs (2005, 2006 and 2007), reproduced in Table 
5, below, 
 




Total expenditure 11315 12357 13111
% of GDP 1.01% 1.04% 1.06%
Participants 7571 7836 7824
% of the labour force 25.9% 26.7% 26.4%  
 
together with data on labour force and on the gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
UK
13, we can conclude that: 
￿  tax credit expenditure, alone, represents between 1 and 1.2% of the UK GDP; 
￿  by adding tax credits expenditure to that effectively record by the Eurostat in 
categories 2-7, total ALMP in the UK would represent 84% and 86% of total LMP 
                                                
11   Considering population aged 15-64 years old. 
12   Own estimates based on the number of households entitled: couples (2 persons) plus single-person 
households. 
13   Source: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/queentree/... - Annual data (extraction date: July 2007).   14 
expenditures (categories 2-9) in 2003 and 2005, respectively. This compares with 33% 
and 29%, in 2003 and 2005, for the EU15 average; 
￿  between 2003 to 2005, real terms per capita, annual average expenditure growth 
on tax credits amounted to 4,6%.
14 
 
Finally, and regarding participants, the in-work CTC together with the WTC covered, in 
2003  to  2005,  around  26%  of  the  UK  labour  force.  These  figures  are  difficult  to 
compare with the representativeness of those in the Eurostat LMP database because of 
the missing data on LMP stocks of participants for most of the EU15 countries. For 
instance,  for  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  two  countries  with  higher  than  EU15 
average expenditure on LMP, participants in total LMP (categories 2-9) represented, in 




3. THE FRENCH PPE - PRIME POUR L’EMPLOI 
 
3.1.  DESIGN AND AIM OF THE MEASURE 
 
The PPE is referred in the NAPE as “the primary tool for making employment more 
remunerative,  designed  to  help  offset  the  higher  tax  rates  and  reduction  in  social 
security assistance
16 that accompany a return to work” (French NAPE 2003: 116). It 
intends  to  favour  transitions  from  inactivity  and  unemployment  to  employment  by 
means of improving disposable income instead of reducing social transfers (Evaluation 
de la Strategie Europeenne pour l’Emploi, 2002: 22).  
Established in 2001, the PPE is a tax credit that increases net income for low-income 
working people. It applies to tax households in which at least one person holds a job and 
for which the declared income for income tax purposes is below a ceiling of 1.4 times 
the minimum wage (SMIC), or 2.1 times the SMIC for a married couple, one of whom 
is  working.  The  basis  for  computation  are  working  time,  family  status,  number  of 
children,  taxable  income  of  the  household,  individual  gross  income  and  the  gross 
income of the spouse. The tax credit is made up of a variable component and a lump-
sum component. The variable component is calculated on a graduated, increasing basis 
according to the number of hours worked (between 30% and 100% of the SMIC)
17 and 
on a graduated, decreasing basis according to the wage, which may range between 1 and 
1.4 the SMIC. The lump-sum component of the PPE takes the family situation into 
account (French NAPE 2003: 138) with bonus for inactive spouses and children.  
It has been reformed a number of times. The reform of 2003 improved slightly the 
situation of those working part-time or only part of the year. Another improvement was 
the establishment of a cash advance - paid if some illegible requirements are met - 
                                                
14   Computation of the GDP deflator using GDP at current and constant prices in the Eurostat database. 
15   Source: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/queentree/... - Annual data (extraction date: July 2007). 
16   The complete loss of minimum integration income and loss of part of individual housing benefit 
(French NAPE 2004: 66). 
17   The gross income has to be at least 30% of the SMIC. In the case of a couple with a sole wage earner 
the gross income of the spouse is not taken into concern. In the case of double earner couples – both 
are required to have a gross income of at least 30% of the SMIC – each of them is entitled to an 
individual amount.   15 
because the bonus, allocated to the income tax, is disbursed in the subsequent year 




3.2. MOTIVATING THE INCLUSION OF PPE IN THE EUROSTAT LMP DATABASE 
 
In this section we will argue in favour of the inclusion of the PPE in a renovated LMP 
database. Its integration in the EES and its effective impacts in the functioning of the 
labour market are considered.  
The French employment policies have changed since the Luxembourg process (even if 
in a clear path dependency process). They changed in terms of the setting of a new 
reference framework (namely the influence of Guidelines), new problems raised (e.g. 
the reference to the employment rate), new decision processes involving other ministries 
than the Ministry of the Employment, namely for policies involving household taxes, 
and in terms of the contents of the policies: for what matters here, the reinforcement of 
active policies, the reforms in the tax and benefit system in order to avoid inactivity 
traps and the reduction of employers’ social security contributions of low wage jobs in 
connection with the reduction of working time (Evaluation de la SEE, 2002). 
 
From the beginning, the French employment strategy is oriented towards improving 
employability, by modelling benefits, taxes and training systems and, in the terms in use 
in Employment Guideline nº19. The French NAPEs have included, on a regular basis, 
measures that aim at ensuring that it is worthwhile to work, continue to work or return 
to work (for instance, French NAPE 2003: 39). 
 
Council  recommendations  on  the  implementation  of  Members’  States  employment 
policies insist on pursuing the reduction of the marginal effective tax rate to encourage 
workers to seek and remain in work, particularly those unskilled and low-paid (OJEC, 
2002: L 60/75). 
 
Assessing the effective impacts of the PPE on the labour market functioning 
This  measure  covers  a  large  proportion  of  the  employment  and  the  labour  force. 
Available data refer only to tax households (see Table 5, below), with no information on 
individual beneficiaries. But if at least one member of the household holds a job, a 
minimum of 8.3 million of workers are beneficiaries of this measure – this represents a 
large proportion (about one third) of the total employment in 2003. It also mobilises a 
large amount of public resources (see Table 1, in section 1, above). Public expenditure 
on the measure progressed from 1220 million euros in 2001, to 2221 million euros in 
2003 0.14% of the GDP. The latter is an interesting figure when compared with the 
corresponding  indicator  of  the  public  expenditure  devoted  to  active  measures 
(categories 2-7) in the LMP database: 0.82% of the GDP. 
 
                                                
18   The measure has been modified in subsequent periods: it has been paid in the form of twelve monthly 
instalments since summer 2006, and the amounts paid in 2005 and 2006 have been raised (Republique 
Française, 2006).    16 
TABLE 5: Coverage of the PPE 
  2001  2002 
 
2003 
Tax households beneficiaries of 
PPE (millions) 
8.7  8.5  8.3 
% of total tax households  26.3 %  25.5%  25% 
 
Source: Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry; General Tax Directorate, Forecasting 
Directorate Analysis, in French NAPE (2004: 154). 
 
The characteristics of the beneficiaries are not well known, by lack of published studies, 
but,  given  the  conditions  of  entitlement,  they  must  be  close  to  the  majority  of  the 
beneficiaries of target employment policies, that is to say, those of a secondary labour 
market.
19 According to available information (INSEE, 2002
20) more than one third of 
the beneficiaries were under 30 years old and 34% have worked short working time, 
because of part-time work and or because of not working all the year long.
21 
22 About 
two thirds of the beneficiaries declared revenues from work between 1 and 1.4 of the 
SMIC, what is consistent with the entitlement conditions. 
 






To access the first topic, the question is if the PPE can reduce unemployment and if it 
can foster labour supply and the employment rate. Some studies (e.g., Stancanelli and 
Sterdyniak,  2004)  try  to  measure  incentive  and  disincentive  effects  of  the  PPE,  by 
estimating the financial gains and the marginal effective tax rates for different cases of 
beneficiaries taking a job, depending on the composition of the household and on the 
previous household supply of labour and on the type of working time (full time or part-
time). The differences that were found among different groups of individuals do not 
allow the statement of general conclusions. Other studies state that inactivity traps have 
been  removed.
23  Also  the  NAPEs  are  very  optimistic  in  this  sense.  However,  the 
decision  of  participation  in  the  labour  market  is  much  more  complex
24  and  the 
simulation of the labour supply effects requires the use of very complex models with the 
adoption of controversial hypothesis. 
 
A review of several ex-ante studies presented by Stancanelli and Sterdyniak (2004) 
states that  the  positive effects of PPE over the supply of labour are small, ranging 
                                                
19   In the sense of the labour market segmentation theory of M. Piore.  
20   The  data  are  extracted  from  an  analysis  of  a  random  sample  of  500  000  fiscal  declarations  of 
beneficiaries of the PPE concerning the revenue of the year 2000.  
21   In 2000, 16.7% of the total employment was in part-time (European Commission, 2004a). 
22   It should also be noted that the bonus for those taking part-time has been improved by the reform of 
2003. 
23   According to C. Hagneré, A. Trannoy (2001) “L’impact conjugué de trois ans de réforme sur les 
trappes à innactivité” Economie & Statistique, nº 346-347, 2001, reforms at the end of the nineties 
together  with  the  PPE  tend  to  eliminate  short  term  inactivity  traps  (Evaluation  de  la  Stratégie 
Européenne pour l’Emploi, 2002). 
24   Laroque and Salinié (2000) and (2002).   17 
between 0.2% and 0.4%. Therefore, the debate pursues on the adequacy of an institution 
such as the PPE to the French labour market, very complex in the architecture of its 
incentives, very far from achieving full employment, and with high minimum wages.
25 
In the search for better alternatives, should not demand-side measures be more effective 
to stimulate the hiring of less skilled workers? All the alternatives have positive and 
negative effects and the choices are difficult.  
 
Income and redistribution effects 
 
Income and redistribution effects of PPE are also under debate. First, the increase in the 
disposable income of the households is quite modest. This is due to the low level of the 
bonus - when compared with the UK tax credits - even if every year the average annual 
amounts per household have been increasing: from 145 euros in 2001, to 250 euros in 
2003  (French  NAPE,  2004:  66).  Second,  available  ex-ante  studies  conclude  that 
redistributive effects (comparing those in and out of PPE
26) would be small (Stancanelli 
and Sterdyniak 2004: 20). In 2003, the adjustment of the scale used to calculate the PPE 
in the benefit of those working part-time (all year round or only part of the year) would 
“result  in  an  increase  of  more  than  10%  in  the  financial  gain  stemming  from  a 
resumption  of  employment  for  a  single  worker  on  the  RMI
27  returning  to  half-time 
employment at the minimum wage” (French NAPE 2003: 138
28). Estimations made by 
Legendre, Lorgnet, Mahieu and Thibault (2004: 53) account for important redistributive 
effects (among recipients of the PPE) of this reform: those individuals in the first decile 
of living standard beneficiated noticeably the most.  
 
In  conclusion,  PPE  is  a  labour  market  policy  measure  intended  to  improve  the 
functioning of the labour market, in the sense expected by the EES and using their 
selected instruments: making work pay by enhancing in-work revenues. The measure is 
also  targeted  to  particular  groups  and  improvements  in  the  targeting  have  been 
attempted over time. Its employment and redistribution effects are not yet very clear, 
and seem, for the moment, quite modest. Ex-post studies in order to better evaluate 
these effects are still missing. However, we would argue that the degree of performance 
has never been a criterion to the inclusion of a policy measure in the Eurostat LMP 
database. Several of the currently reported target measures have negligible effects on 
the  functioning  of  the  labour  market.  The  point  here  is  that  there  is  no  reason  for 
excluding a measure like PPE from the Eurostat LMP database.  
 
 
                                                
25  See, for instance, Cahuc (2002). 
26  For those with the most modest income because those with insufficient pay in employment or out of 
employment have no access to the PPE due to entitlement conditions. 
27   Revenue Minimum d’Insertion, the French system of minimum income. 
28   “More specifically, he or she will benefit from a theoretical additional income of €104 per year due to 
the PPE, without taking into account the indexing of the PPE scale or any increase of the SMIC” 
(French NAPE 2003: 138).   18 
4. GENERAL REDUCTION OF EMPLOYERS’ SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS ON LOW AND MID-
LEVEL WAGES IN FRANCE 
 
4.1. DESIGN AND AIM OF THE MEASURE 
 
In this section we focus on the general reductions of employers’ social contributions in 
the  sense  that  they  apply  to  all  wage  workers  employed  in  the  private  sector, 
irrespective of their industry, geographical location or the age of the worker.
29 But they 
are also targeted to low-level of wages, up to a certain ceiling that has been changing 
throughout the time.  
 
The  implementation  of  general  measures  to  reduce  employers’  social  contributions 
started in France in 1993. Since then, several modifications have been made respecting 
the level of wages covered (from 1.1 to 1.7 times the minimum wage, to finally be fixed 
at 1.6 in July 2005), the degree of reduction (from 5.4 to 26% of contributions), and 
respecting the form of reduction (from a scale in stairs to a linear decreasing scale).
30 As 
suggested by L’Horty (2006), understanding the “demography” of these reforms helps 
understanding the objectives of the measures. These measures often aim at encouraging 
the hiring of low-skilled workers (see, for example, the French NAPE 2003, 2004) but 
their motivation has been more complex and changing. The first law of Prime Minister 
Balladur had the intention of reducing labour costs in general, but this objective failed 
by budgetary reasons; the reduction was limited to low wages. The reform of Alain Jupé 
in August 1995 has been conceived to avoid the raising of labour costs associated with 
the raising of the minimum wage that was set at the time. Accordingly, this type of 
measures has been classified as “defensive reductions”. The reform of 1996, together 
with the simplification and harmonization of the system – reduction of 18.2 % of social 
security contributions at the level of minimum wage and a linear decreasing reduction 
for higher wages - was also limited by budget constraints, which led to cover jobs paid 
up to 1.33 times the minimum wage. The reduction to 1.3 times the minimum wage in 
1998 had the same meaning. Under L. Jospin, reductions of social security contributions 
were  reformed  in  order  to  compensate  higher  costs  induced  by  the  reductions  in 
working time (2000). Under the reform of 2003 (the Fillon law) that unified the systems 
(incentives became irrespective of working time), the reductions of charges were also 
defensive against the higher minimum pay; the ceiling was then fixed at 1.7 times the 
minimum wage. The last reform returned back to 1.6 minimum wages for budgetary 
considerations. After all, and in contrast with alleged aims stated by the NAPE, “None 
of the reforms have organised an offensive reduction of the labour cost of low-skilled 
work with the aim of reducing unemployment of low-skilled workers” (L’Horty 2006: 3) 
or, in other  words, “to optimise employment effects” (Gafsi, L’Horty  and Mihoubi, 
2005).  
 
                                                
29   Reductions  of  contributions  also  occur  for  target  groups  such  as  youths,  unemployed,  certain 
geographic areas and household employment. These groups are not considered here because they are 
included in the Eurostat LMP database. 
30   In the presentation of these measures we will follow closely the synthesis note by L’Horty (2006).  
These modifications do not include specific measures in the frame of the reduction of working-time 
policy (measures known as “Robien” and “Aubry I”).   19 
4.2.  DISCUSSING  THE  INCLUSION  OF  THE  GENERAL  REDUCTION  OF  EMPLOYERS’ 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE EUROSTAT LMP DATABASE 
 
General reductions of employers’ social security contributions are selected to integrate 
the EES for France, especially under Guideline nº 22: “Ensure employment-friendly 
labour cost developments and wage setting mechanisms by (…) reviewing the impact on 
employment of non-wage labour costs and where appropriate adjust their structure and 
level, specially to reduce the tax burden  on the low-paid”  (OJEC, 2005:  L205/26). 
Several issues of the French NAPE assume that decreasing labour costs will create jobs 
for low-skilled workers. Again, in the new National Reform Programme for Economic 
and Social Growth of October 2005
31, “the battle for jobs serving economic growth”, 
has as its first measure “a) Promoting the employment of the least skilled by lightening 
payroll  taxes”
32.  These  measures  became  the  most  important  type  of  employment 
measures in France. Nowadays they cover almost two thirds of the wage employment, 
and between 2002 and 2004 public expenditure with foregone contributions was about 
15 000 million euros per year
33, 1% of the PIB in 2003.
34 
 
Evaluations of the impact of these measures on low-skill employment present contrasted 
results.
35 Those disparities may be explained by the adoption of different evaluation 
methods (ex ante or ex post), different hypothesis about the behaviour of firms and 
employees, different macroeconomic links and the nature of data (firm or household-
based).  However,  the  main  source  of  disparity  is  the  definition  of  low-skilled 
employment. It may be used a scale of wage, a scale of schooling or an occupational 
hierarchic scale. This choice has important consequences on the degree of substitution 
between  different  categories  of  workers,  a  crucial  factor  in  the  estimation  of  the 
employment effects. Finally, another source of disparity of the results in the studies is 
the variety in the design of the measures throughout time.  
 
To sum up the results in the studies, with a budget of 5 000 million euros is possible to 
create or maintain 250 000 full-time jobs paid at the minimum wage. So, an annual 
budget of about 15 000 million euros in recent years will correspond to 750 000 jobs 
(Gafsi, L’Horty and Mihoubi, 2005).
36 What to conclude about the effects on low-skill 
employment? Reductions seem to be a powerful explanation to the raising of the share 
of low-skill employment in total employment since 1992, but they are a much weaker 
                                                
31  Republique  Française  (2005),  National  Reform  Programme  for  Economic  and  Social  Growth, 
Working Document, October 2005,http://www.sgae.gouv.fr/actualites/docfiles/traductionENPNR.pdf. 
This document replaces the previous NAPE, as explained in the site of the European Union: “Every 
Member State draws up a National Reform Programme (until 2005, National Action Plans) which 
describes how the Employment Guidelines are put into practice at the national level. They present the 
progress achieved in the Member State over the last 12 months and the measures planned for the 
coming  12  months:  they  are  both  reporting  and  planning 
documents.”(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/national_en.htm) 
32  Official translation of “a) Promouvoir l’emploi des moins qualifiés par l’allègement des prélèvements 
sociaux” of the French version (p. 25). 
33   Source: Acoss- Urssaf  (Rouxelin, 2005: 2). It covers general reductions concerning low wages and 
working-time reductions. 
34   French NAPE 2004, table 20. 
35   Following the synthesis of L’Horty (2006) over 14 studies that have been taken into account, the 
employment may be multiplied by a factor between 1 to 4.5. 
36   The estimation of the impact over skill employment is still more uncertain in the studies surveyed by 
L’Horty 2006. For a more in-depth presentation see Gafsi, L’Horty and Mihoubi, 2005.   20 
explanation  for  the  rising  of  total  employment  and  low-skill  employment  (Gafsi, 
L’Horty and Mihoubi, 2005).
37 
 
If economic evaluations lead to less optimistic results than it was expected respecting a 
large group of beneficiaries and budgetary costs, this does not invalidate that they are 
the  most  important  employment  measure  used  in  France.  By  showing  the  various 
modalities of an employment policy consisting of subsidies to firms in the form of 
reduction of social contributions, we argue that these measures could be included in the 
Eurostat LMP database: they are, in fact, mainly targeted to particular groups and to low 
and mid-wage jobs. 
 
Apparently, for these measures to improve over the employment of the low-skilled, of 
the low-wage/income and that of those facing a higher risk of unemployment, their 
target  should  be  further  developed.  Indeed,  a  better  targeting,  closer  to  the  current 
database  underlying  criteria,  would  enlarge  legitimacy  for  the  inclusion  of  these 
measures  in  the  Eurostat  LMP  database.  However,  if  social  contributions  evolve 
towards a formal system of scales (as those applying to the income taxes), changing the 
current  nature  of  the  socialized  wage  (Friot,  1998),  these  measures  will  be  less 




                                                
37  There is no necessary coincidence between low-wage jobs, beneficiaries of reductions and low skill 
workers (Jamet, 2005, Gafsi, L’Horty and Mihoubi, 2005). 
38   The E. Malinvaud report Les cotisations sociales à la charge des employeurs: analyse économique, 
Rapport  du  Conseil  d’Analyse  Economique,  1998,  proposed  the  setting  of  an  increasing  rate  for 
employers’ social security contributions (L’Horty, 2005).    21 
5.  FINAL REMARKS 
 
In this text we discuss if UK and French tax credits and general reductions of social 
contributions  in  France  could  be  included  in  a  renovated  Eurostat  LMP  database, 
especially because of the level of public expenditure and the number of participants. We 
have already presented, above, the lines of argument: these measures are a too much 
influent  labour  market  policies  to  be  in  some  sort  neglected  by  the  harmonised 
European  statistical  system.  Many  other  policies
39  in  the  EU  countries  should  be 
carefully analysed with the same purpose – should they be included?  
 
Tax credits, traditionally classified as fiscal measures, are not explicitly considered as 
labour market policies, but they do have effects on the functioning of the labour market 
through  raising  incentives  for  keeping  and  taking  jobs  (targeting  unemployed  and 
inactive  workers).  As  for  reductions  of  social  security  contributions,  they  act  as  a 
demand-side device, reducing labour costs and promoting employment, especially for 
the low-wage earners. 
 
The complex set of State policies, characterizing the present orientation towards both 
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participants involved in non-harmonised national databases and leads to the potential 
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